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2. *Portugal or Britain*

175 Several European powers were interested in the country into which the Ngoni moved in the 1870s. France and Germany both had a general interest in central Africa, and although their areas of greatest activity were elsewhere, they did not leave the country round Mpezeni entirely alone. The French explorer Giraud travelled through what is now the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia and down the Shire Valley in 1883-5, and his compatriot Foà was in the region between Mpezeni and the Zambezi at various times between 1891 and 1897. The White Fathers, a Catholic order at that time recruited largely in France, began work in Bemba country to the north of Mpezeni, and on the Zambezi to the south, during the 1890s. In 1892 Major von Wissmann travelled up the Shire Valley on his way to consolidate the German interest in south-western Tanganyika.

The fate of the plateau bounded by the Luangwa, Zambezi and Shire valleys, with its healthy climate, good pastures, and alleged deposits of gold was, however, the particular concern not of France or Germany, but of Portugal and Britain. The Portuguese settlements on the east coast of Africa guarding the long route to India had been founded in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese soon discovered, or were shown by the Arabs who had been there before them, the Missale gold-mines some forty miles south of present-day Ngoniland. These mines could not compare with the richer treasures discovered south of the Zambezi but they were worth exploiting and there was always the prospect of further discoveries in the vicinity. However in the middle of the eighteenth century the Jesuits, who had been the most penetrating of the Portuguese explorers, were expelled from all Portuguese possessions, and interest in the region lapsed. At the end of the century the quest began for a route to link the Portuguese settlements on the east and west coasts. Pereira and Lacerda passed through Missale in 1796 and 1798 on their visits to the Lunda chief Kazembe and similar routes were followed by Baptista and Jose in 1811, by Monteiro and Gamitto in 1831 and by Silva Porto in 1854. These [439] travellers were interested mainly in ivory and minerals and in securing unmolested passage for their caravans from coast to coast. Although the Portuguese were anxious to keep Britain out of central Africa, the only attempt they made to colonize this portion of the interior was at a short-lived military post, north of Mpezeni's future country in the Luangwa Valley, occupied from 1827 to 1829 and then abandoned.[4]

[4] Poole, 'Portuguese settlement', p. 164. See Map B.

[Text continues on page 68]

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Livingstone was the first Briton to reach this area. In 1866 he passed through what was to become Mpezeni's country,[5] and in his journals he makes frequent references to Ngoni raids. Unfortunately his carriers would not take him to Ngoni villages and all he saw of Ngoni activity were burnt-out huts and dead bodies killed in battle. The accounts of his journeys stimulated British interest in the region round Lake Nyasa, a centre for the slave trade, and led to the arrival there of missionaries and settlers. In 1874 the Livingstonia Mission was founded and in 1883 a British consul was first appointed to the Shire Highlands.[6]

Mpezeni's country lay some distance from the main centres of British and Portuguese activity, but was not without importance. Apart from Missale, it was thought that there were other gold deposits to be found in the area. In contrast with their harried neighbours, the prosperous Ngoni with their herds of cattle attracted travellers while the pleasant climate of the plateau, compared with the hot valleys of Luangwa, Zambezi, and Nyasa, made it suitable for European colonization. Yet the Ngoni army was formidable, and had to be neutralized in some way if other settlements were to be safe. Mpezeni's country flanked several trade routes of importance from the Zambezi and Lake Nyasa inland to the sources of slaves and ivory. For these various reasons Mpezeni's country attracted the attention of traders and governments, those interested in benefiting by the slave trade as well as those seeking to end it. In addition towards the end of the century when it became clear that Africa was to be completely divided between the Powers, any territory, however inhospitable, that had not already been claimed attracted the attention of treaty-making explorers.

The first move towards incorporating the Fort Jameson Ngoni in a colonial empire was made by the Portuguese who had been stimulated by the increasing British interest in Nyasaland. In November 1888 the Governor-General of Moçambique instructed Wiese, a German[7] trader who had already made contact with Mpezeni, to lead an expedition to him. According to Johnston, Wiese and an associate were offered £2,000 to secure Mpezeni's submission to Portugal.[8] Wiese was well received and distributed flags to Mpezeni and his sons. The Portuguese regarded the

[5] *Last Journals*, i, p. 150.
[6] Johnston, *British Central Africa*, pp. 55-69.
[7] In *A & P*, 1890-1, lvii, p. 683, the Portuguese Foreign Minister describes Wiese as a Dutchman. This appears to be incorrect in the light of Wiese's contacts with the German Legation in Lisbon.
[8] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 235; 49, p. 19. (To save space, all public records will be identified by a serial number printed **bold face**, taken from the first column of the Bibliography, List C.)

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guese, Mpezeni refused to see Sharpe, while according to Johnston Sharpe had used up his stock of presents before reaching Mpezeni and hence did not attempt to negotiate with him. Sharpe found Wiese at Mpezeni's with a Portuguese officer and on 11 December 1889 witnessed the formal presentation of a Portuguese flag to one of Nsingu's lieutenants, though, 'for reasons of correctness', he was not asked to sign the document officially recording the incident.[15]

Although Wiese was leading the Portuguese party, he spoke bitterly to Sharpe of the way in which the Portuguese had treated him and indicated to him and in a letter to Johnston that he might consider working in the British interest. Johnston replied in January 1890 with a letter of 'a non-compromising but vaguely reassuring character'.[16]

In March 1890 Sharpe began another journey to Mpezeni, this time with instructions from Johnston to make a treaty with Mpezeni and to 'buy' Wiese with an offer of up to £1,000 a year for three years. He arrived at Mpezeni's village on 24 March, only to find that Wiese had left for Tete over a month earlier, leaving behind him the Portuguese officer. Mpezeni kept Sharpe waiting for an interview until 4 April, and although friendly he refused to discuss a treaty or accept a British flag. Sharpe left a letter for Wiese, offering him £300 a year for his services, and departed for the Luangwa Valley. After an unprofitable trip he returned to Mpezeni's on 21 May, to find Wiese and the Portuguese officer on the point of leaving for a trading-trip to Kasungu. Wiese rejected Sharpe's offer of £300 a year and Sharpe was forced to return to Nyasa with both the principal aims of his expedition unaccomplished. He had, however, made a few treaties with non-Ngoni chiefs.[17] Thomson, another explorer who, like Sharpe, was employed by Rhodes's British South Africa Company, arrived in Ngoni country in December 1890 after a successful trip to the Lala. Thomson was greeted with hostility, sheltered with Wiese, and fled during the night.[18]

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Johnston played a dual role in Nyasaland, for besides representing the British Foreign Office he was also responsible for the interests of Rhodes and the British South Africa Company, from

[15] 15, fo. 26-7; 16, fo. 144; *Boletim Official de Moçambique*, 21 (24 May 1890), p. 239.

[16] Wiese may have offered his services to Johnston before Sharpe arrived at Mpezeni's. cf. 49; 158, p. 62; 16, fo. 145-6.

[17] 9, fo. 30; 16, fo. 146; 18, fo. 274-95; Sharpe, 'Journey from Lake Nyassa', pp. 745, 749; Johnston, *British Central Africa*, p. 89; Wiese, 'Expedição', xi, pp. 412-31, 464-80.

[18] Thomson, 'Lake Bangweolo', p. 114; Wiese, 'Expedição', xi, p. 588.

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whom he received a subsidy. When that company was granted its first charter on 29 October 1889, its sphere of operations was restricted to south of the Zambezi. When Johnston began work north of the river the future division of responsibility between the Foreign Office and the B.S.A. Company was uncertain. On 21 September 1889 Buchanan, on Johnston's instructions, proclaimed a British Protectorate over the region round the Shire Highlands, and on 14 May 1891 this was superseded by the proclamation of a British Protectorate over approximately the whole of present-day Nyasaland. In April 1891 the Foreign Office sanctioned the extension of the B.S.A. Company's operations to the north of the Zambezi within the British sphere of influence, excluding Nyasaland. It was, however, still uncertain whether or not the administration of the Protectorate was to remain permanently separate from that of the B.S.A. Company's territory to the west. A complicated story of financial negotiations and of a quarrel between Johnston and Rhodes ended in an agreement whereby after 30 June 1895 all administrative connexion between the two territories ceased.[19]

The western boundary of the Protectorate proclaimed in 1891 was based on that laid down for the Conventional Basin of the Congo[20] at the Berlin West African Conference in 1885. This line, the Zambezi-Nyasa watershed, passed through the eastern portion of Mpezeni's country, leaving the greater portion of Ngoniland outside the Protectorate. The dividing line between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence was not finally determined until the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of 11 June 1891. Despite the Portuguese flags and Wiese's affirmations of friendship, the whole of Mpezeni's country was placed by this agreement in the British and not in the Portuguese sphere, as it had also been in the unratified convention of 20 August 1890.[21] As a consequence, then, of the proclamation of the Nyasaland Protectorate, the extension northwards of the B.S.A. Company's sphere of activity, and the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, Mpezeni's country was divided between the Protectorate and the B.S.A. Company's territory. In consequence of the agreement, or because Mpezeni was tired of them, Wiese and the Portuguese expedition left Ngoniland.

Despite this formal division Mpezeni had as yet, as Johnston was to point out six years later, 'ceded nothing to anybody'.[22] On

[19] *State papers*, lxxxi, p. 1009, No. 243; *London Gazette*, 15 May 1891 and 24 February 1893; *A & P*, 1890, li, pp. 634-40; *A & P*, 1895, lxxi, pp. 565-8; Johnston, *Story of my life*, p. 497.
[20] *A & P*, 1884-5, lv, p. 439.
[21] *A & P*, 1890-1, lvii, pp. 589, 625; *A & P*, 1890-1, xcvi, p. 420.
[22] 158, p. 63. cf. 132, p. 59.

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These events made the inclusion of Mpezeni's country in the British colonial empire highly likely. The way in which this would come about was still not obvious, nor had it yet been decided who should control the economic resources of the area. It was the struggle for economic control which in the end decided the political issue. Here again Wiese played a prominent part.

3. *Concession hunters*

From 1885, if not before, Wiese lived in Ngoni country and among the neighbouring tribes as a trader.[27] His wife, who lived with him part of the time in Mpezeni's country, was Doña Romana, a black Portuguese lady who owned some hundreds of slaves. Wiese's commercial objectives can be inferred from the conversation he had with Sharpe on this matter in May 1890, when he mentioned that he employed over two hundred and fifty of his wife's slaves as elephant-hunters, and that he was planning to employ two thousand men in trading expeditions to the Luapula, Garanganze and other distant places. He was also at that time planning to make war on a certain Cewa chief.[28]

According to Wiese's own account, he gained a number of concessions from chiefs and he was granted in 1887 various mining rights by the Portuguese Government in the territory to the south of Mpezeni. On 15 November 1886 Mpezeni orally granted him a concession for ninety-nine years and, Wiese claimed, this agreement was ratified in writing on 14 April 1891. Mpezeni, described as 'Paramount Chief of the Angoni (Zulus) and Sovereign Ruler over Maravia and Western Nyassaland', granted Wiese a concession in 'one part' of his country some 6,700 square miles in extent and reaching to within twelve miles of the Zambezi near Chicoa. In return for exclusive mineral, timber, water, railway and other rights, Wiese agreed to pay Mpezeni £200 annually and 1 per cent of his profits. Mpezeni reserved the rights of sovereignty over his people and the land, water and timber necessary to his subjects were guaranteed.[29]

A few months before this written concession was drawn up, Bowler and Rankin, representing the comprehensively named Upper and Lower Zambezi Navigation, Exploration, Trading, Land-acquiring and Colonization Company, Limited, arrived in

[27] Lancaster, 'Chronology', p. 86, says that Wiese visited Mpezeni in 1881. Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 71, in another tentative chronology, follows him, although there is no mention of this visit in the body of Poole's book. Wiese himself appears not to mention any date earlier than 1885. See 40.

[28] 67, fo. 199; 22, fo. 285.

[29] 31, pp. 17-18.

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the country.[30] They joined Wiese in collecting concessions from the surrounding chiefs.[31]

A legal procedure for registering and recognizing concessions within the British sphere was established by Johnston on 18 July 1891.[32] Without recognition by Johnston's Land Court, a concession did not of itself establish a clear right to title under British law. The issue of this proclamation may have been prompted by Wiese's actions. In June, shortly before it was issued, Wiese was travelling to Europe with his concessions. He met Johnston at Quilimane and asked him to recognize them.[33] Johnston refused to do this. He particularly objected to the concession from Mpezeni, not only for its monopolies but also because it had not been signed by Mpezeni but only by a Portuguese allegedly acting on the chief's behalf, and because Mpezeni did not control the large area mentioned in the concession. Such land as he did control he had obtained only by dispossessing the earlier inhabitants. Johnston regarded Wiese as a slave trader who forced chiefs to make their mark on documents without explaining what the documents meant and without making any payment for the concessions obtained. He maintained that Mpezeni had never granted any rights to Wiese and wrote of the concession: 'I always refused to recognize his preposterous document.' He complained that Wiese tried to 'bounce the British Government into recognition of his (wholly unfounded) claims'. Johnston later argued that in order to conclude eight of his other treaties, Wiese must have travelled five hundred miles between 20 December and 23 January, an improbable occurrence.[34] Acting on this policy Johnston insisted, at Quilimane, that he must examine Wiese's concessions before he could pronounce on them. Wiese made a declaration before Johnston's deputy describing the concessions and went on his way to Europe, he maintaining he had thereby registered his concessions and Johnston maintaining he had not.[35]

Wiese's agents in London began corresponding with the Foreign Office in December 1891 pressing for the recognition of his

[30] Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*, p. 241; 27, fo. 390-1.
[31] Bradley, 'Salute to adventurers', p. 54, says Wiese bought concessions from Bowler and Rankin.
[32] 36; 58, fo. 420.
[33] 40, p. 33; 49, p. 14; 67, fo. 140; 81, fo. 144-5.
[34] 49; 81, fo. 148.
[35] There is some uncertainty about the date on which Wiese made his statement at Quilimane. Johnston refers to a declaration sworn to by Wiese before the Acting Vice-Consul on 7 June 1891. Bowler's letter to the Foreign Office was supported by a copy of a receipt for a fee paid for witnessing a signature, dated 27 June. cf. 35; 48, p. 15; 71.

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concessions. In January 1892 Wiese offered his services to Johnston as an agent, and in March repeated the offer. He seems to have mentioned the possibility of his leading the Ngoni in battle on behalf of the Administration. Johnston rejected these offers contemptuously along with similar offers made by Bowler, saying that he wanted Bowler and Wiese to remain in Europe. He also remained adamant in his refusal to recognize Wiese's concessions, although the Foreign Office itself continued to prevaricate on this issue.[36]

In 1891 or 1892 Wiese visited Lisbon in an effort to collect the £2,000 owing to him for his services to the Portuguese during 1888 and the following years. It was, however, in London that he tried to obtain financial backing so that he could begin to exploit his concessions, with or without recognition from Johnston. According to Johnston, Wiese offered his concessions to the Central African and Zoutpansberg Exploration Company, with which the naval explorer Cameron was connected. In August 1892 Wiese told Johnston that he was no longer personally interested in the fate of the concessions. According to a Foreign Office minute, Wiese offered the concessions to the B.S.A. Company for a small sum in January 1893. The search for financial support ended on 18 February 1893 when the Mozambique Gold Land and Concessions Company Limited was incorporated in London to operate Wiese's concessions, for which they paid him £1,500.[37]

The Mozambique Company approached the Foreign Office and were instructed first to register their concessions in Nyasaland. According to Johnston, early in 1893 Bowler sent copies of the concessions to Johnston, who replied that he must produce the originals or certified copies. In April and May 1893 there was an exchange of letters between Wiese and Johnston about the recognition of the concessions, and in the autumn Bowler wrote again on the matter. However, according to Johnston, between June and October 1891 the African Lakes and British South Africa companies had placed claims before his Land Court for recognition in the prescribed manner and no counter-claims were registered there.[38] Therefore, on 25 September 1893 Johnston granted a certificate of claim to the B.S.A. Company, in its commercial capacity, entitling them to exercise mining and other rights throughout the greater part of what was to become North-Eastern Rhodesia and including the whole of Mpezeni's country outside Nyasaland.

[36] 39; 42; 46, fo. 7; 47, fo. 36; 48; 49; 51; 52; 64, fo. 85-6.

[37] 67, fo. 140; 81, fo. 145; 64, fo. 89 (minute); 230, p. 69; *Maugham report*, p. 6.

[38] 80; 81, fo. 144, 146; 82.

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175 The B.S.A. Company produced in its support treaties made by
439 Sharpe and Stevenson with six chiefs, Mpezeni not among them.
648 Johnston's argument for including Mpezeni's country within the area of the grant appears to have been that the land had been wrested by Mpezeni from the treaty-making chiefs. None of the six chiefs mentioned by name in the certificate made any claim in the treaties to rights in Mpezeni's country, and indeed only one of them, Muliro, a minor Nsenga-Ambo chief, bordered on Mpezeni.

However Johnston also refers in the certificate of claim to 'similar privileges obtained through treaties concluded by the African Lakes Company and transferred by them to the British South Africa Company (the said treaties have received separate confirmation at my hands)'. These additional treaties are not specified in the certificate but later Johnston wrote, in connexion with the North Charterland Concession granted by the B.S.A. Company, that 'the B.S.A. Company would base its right to grant this concession on its recognized treaties with Undi, Mwasi Kazungu and ... (I forget the names), the indigenous and partially dispossessed chiefs of Mpezeni's country'. Sharpe had made a treaty with Undi
131 on 15 April 1891, in which the northern boundary of Undi's
175 territory was said to be the parallel of latitude 14° S. or thereabouts,
439 thus cutting into the southern fringe of the no-man's-land round
648 Mpezeni. Mwase made two treaties, one on 17 September 1885 with Stevenson as agent of the African Lakes Company and another on 30 November 1889 with the British Crown. In the earlier treaty the extent of Mwase's country is not stated but when the benefits of this treaty were transferred to the B.S.A. Company in 1893, Mwase's country was said to be bounded on the west by the water-parting between the Luangwa and Zambezi-Nyasa basins and on the south by the Anglo-Portuguese border. This water-parting does not meet the Anglo-Portuguese frontier until as far west as about 31° 15′ E., in what is now Petauke District, and in Ngoniland it runs approximately east-west on latitude 13° 49′ S. In the area controlled by Mpezeni, Mwase's territory, as defined in the transfer agreement, included the whole portion claimed by Undi in 1891 and in addition a strip of land to the north of Undi's claim, forming the southern margin of the Ngoni settled area. The main concentration of Ngoni villages, in the valleys of the Lutembwe, Lunthwele and Msipazi rivers, lay just north of the territory
175 claimed for Mwase. Thus the grant of rights to the B.S.A. Company
439 in Mpezeni's country appears to have been based for the most
648 part on treaties made with chiefs whose names Johnston forgot,

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and possibly also on the 1889 treaty between Mwase and the British Crown.[39]

Johnston granted a second certificate of claim, completed on 28 September 1893, to the African Lakes and B.S.A. companies jointly, based on the 1891 treaty with Undi and on another made a week later with a neighbouring chief. The area mentioned in this certificate conforms to that laid down in the treaty.[40]

Therefore when Warton arrived in Nyasaland in 1894 as emissary of the Mozambique Company and tried to secure recognition of Wiese's concessions, he found that the area claimed by his company had already been granted to its rivals. He succeeded in registering the concessions but not in gaining recognition of their validity.

Johnston registered, but did not recognize, the Wiese concessions. On the other hand the concessions acquired by the B.S.A. Company, though registered and recognized by Johnston, were not yet confirmed by the Foreign Office. Johnston's conduct of the affair did not meet with approval from his superiors at home, who thought that Warton had been unfairly treated.[41] One consideration influencing the Foreign Office may have been Wiese's German nationality. There had been an Anglo-German Agreement in 1891[42] defining the spheres of influence of these two countries in central Africa, but Maugham suggests that the Foreign Office thought that Wiese, after offering his services to Portugal and Britain, might now turn to Germany who could then use his concessions as the basis of a claim to the territory. At the same time the Foreign Office thought it might be unwise to declare the concessions invalid, since they might sometime be acquired by the B.S.A. Company and be used to strengthen its hand. Wiese, who according to Johnston had run away from Germany to evade conscription, had nevertheless received the support of the German Minister in Lisbon in securing rights to extensive estates in Portuguese East Africa in lieu of the £2,000 he had been promised originally by the Portuguese Government. Johnston suspected Wiese of trying to introduce German methods on his estates and wrote that it would be 'awkward' if the land between Nyasaland and the coast were 'in the hands of a stronger Power than Portugal and one

[39] 73; 75, fo. 180-1; 76; 7, fo. 33; 158, p. 61. I am much indebted to Sir Dougal Malcolm and the British South Africa Company for permission to cite the 1885 treaty and the transfer agreement of 1893. Unfortunately I have been unable to trace the 1889 treaty.

[40] 74.

[41] 85.

[42] *A & P*, 1890, li, pp. 24-31.

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175 far less likely to yield its pretensions'. These considerations found
439 expression in the agreement of 24 November 1894, allowing the
B.S.A. Company to take over from Johnston the administration of
648 its sphere north of the Zambezi. The Foreign Office stipulated that sanction for the treaties made by the B.S.A. Company's agents was to be without prejudice to Wiese's possible claims.[43]

The Mozambique Company opened negotiations with the B.S.A. Company with these registered but unrecognized concessions as their asset. Agreement was reached on 8 May 1895. In return for any rights they might have in the British sphere under Wiese's concessions, and conditional on their raising certain capital, the Mozambique Company were granted mineral and land rights in a block of land ten thousand square miles in extent within the B.S.A. Company's territory. The rights of Natives were to be respected. Any rights the Mozambique Company might have in Portuguese territory were not to be exercised. A new company, the North Charterland Exploration Company, in which the B.S.A. Company had an interest, was formed to operate the grant of land. Thus the North Charterland Concession came into being. The whole of Mpezeni's country, except for that portion included in the Nyasaland Protectorate, came within the Concession.[44]

Some thirty-five years later, Mr. Justice Maugham was to rule that this grant to the Mozambique Company could only have been potential, not actual, since at that time the B.S.A. Company did not yet possess the mineral and other rights they were making over. At the time this consideration carried no weight. In April 1895, even before agreement with the B.S.A. Company had been concluded, the Mozambique Company's pioneer party reached Tete. They arrived in Ngoniland in the following year.[45]

4. *European consolidation*

175 In Nyasaland fighting continued sporadically in an attempt to
439 end the slave trade. From 1891 onwards Johnston's troops fought
567 a series of engagements with Arabs, Yao and southern Ngoni.
648 Mpezeni was regarded not only as a robber with whom no treaties
721 were necessary but also as a partner in the slave trade, for one of the main routes used by Arabs and their African colleagues ran near Mpezeni's country.[46] All Ngoni raids were interpreted by the Nyasaland Administration as raids for slaves and Sharpe, describing his second visit to Mpezeni, wrote that the chief did a brisk

[43] 67, fo. 141-2; 95, p. 48.
[44] 99; 100.
[45] *Maugham report*, pp. 6-7.
[46] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 3 (1 February 1896), p. 2, and iii, 8 (15 April 1896), p. 1.

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trade in slaves, selling them to the Arabs.[47] Wiese's evidence on this point is contradictory. In 1881 he wrote that Arab caravans continually visited Mpezeni and that most of the raids were to capture slaves for sale to the Arabs. In 1900, he wrote in one place that some captives were sold to the Arabs and in another that Mpezeni scarcely knew of the permanent slave hunters and that the sole object of major raids was to gain captives to cultivate the Ngoni fields.[48] Few tales of the Arabs and no nicknames have survived to the present time among the Ngoni, and it is probable that Sharpe was overestimating the importance to Mpezeni of the external slave trade. Although Livingstone knew it, Wiese and Kerr are the only contemporary writers who were aware that captives were assimilated,[49] for other writers do not distinguish between captives and slaves. Whether or not the raids were made for Ngoni recruits or for slaves to be sold to the Arabs, it is clear that they were often made into Nyasaland and thus challenged the Administration there. Towards the end of 1895 the Collector at Kotakota opened a campaign against Mwase Kasungu, the Cewa chief whose territory lay between Mpezeni and the Ngoni of northern Nyasaland. It is alleged that Mpezeni offered to help Mwase in this campaign, but it seems that no help arrived. On 31 December 1895 the fortified village of Kasungu was captured and Chabisa, a chief who had been helping Mwase, fled to Mpezeni.[51]

Chabisa may have been the moving spirit behind the delegation which early in 1896 went from Mpezeni to the Ngoni of northern Nyasaland calling on them to rise with him and Chabisa against the British.[52] The Livingstonia Mission had already been working among the northern Ngoni for eighteen years, and the delegation found little support.

As well as Chabisa, other refugees arrived from the south, after the First Matabele War of 1893 in Southern Rhodesia. According to some accounts the Ndebele Paramount Chief, Lobengula, was with them, only to die a few months later.[53]

[47] Sharpe, 'Lake Nyassa', p. 745. cf. Perham, *Ten Africans*, p. 96.
[48] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 478 and 'Geschichte', pp. 188 and 197.
[49] Livingstone, *Narrative*, p. 385; Kerr, 'Upper Zambesi', p. 396.
[51] Swann, the Collector, in *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 4 (15 February 1896), p. 1; and *A & P*, 1896, lviii, pp. 417, 418, describes Chabisa and Mwase as Ngoni and Zulu chiefs. Money and Smith, 'Explorations', p. 168, say Mwase and Chabisa were brothers. It is unlikely that either was Ngoni. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, p. 144, calls Mwase a Cewa but says he had many Ngoni headmen under him, thereby amending his earlier statements that Mwase and Undi were Ngoni. See 20, fo. 129; *A & P*, 1896, lviii, p. 412. [52] Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, p. 292.
[53] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 10 (15 May 1896), p. 2; Lancaster, 'Tentative chronology', p. 83; Posselt, *Upengula*, pp. 112-24; 98; 121, fo. 193.

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Meanwhile there was a lull in European activity in Mpezeni's country itself. After Wiese and the Portuguese officer left in mid-1891 a Portuguese trader remained behind. He was subsequently killed, either by accident or on Mpezeni's instructions.[54] After sending envoys to Johnston on Lake Nyasa in January 1890 and reporting the death of the Portuguese trader, Mpezeni seems not to have made any attempts to get in touch with Europeans for some years. Johnston sent an influential Swahili headman to visit Mpezeni in 1891, but Mpezeni threatened to behead the messenger if he entered Ngoniland, and he turned back before reaching the country.[55] In 1892 Ngoni patrols sweeping to the south in Undi's country came in touch with a French explorer living there and some of them were killed by his men. In 1895 they made contact with him again and he visited a senior lieutenant of segment 4.[56]

But the Frenchman was a bird of passage. It was not until 5 December 1895 that prospectors arrived with the intention of remaining in the country. They represented the Rhodesia Concessions Company and began to build Fort Partridge at Mafuta's, only twenty miles to the north of Mpezeni.[57] In the face of Johnston's opposition they had been allowed to bring Maxim guns with them. Despite the threat to Mpezeni implicit in this, they were at first received hospitably. Later the Ngoni became less friendly towards them, due, they thought, to the arrival of Chabisa and the Ndebele refugees and also because of the news reaching Mpezeni of increasing British activity in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. In May 1896 the prospectors thought that they might all be massacred and appealed for help to Kotakota. Troops were moved up from the Lake to Kasungu but, as we have mentioned above, they withdrew when it was found that the prospectors were in no danger. Nevertheless the prospectors left Ngoniland on 13 June, not for fear of Mpezeni but because the North Charterland complained that they were poaching on its preserves.[58] Thus the control of Europeans in his country had already passed out of Mpezeni's hands.

There were a number of transient visitors to Mpezeni in 1896,[59] and the B.S.A. Company's representative paid a visit, but

[54] 67, fo. 140.

[55] 81, fo. 147-8.

[56] Foà, *Lac Nyassa*, p. 281, and *Big game*, pp. 84, 105. In another account, 'Traversée de l'Afrique', p. 113, Foà says he visited the lieutenant in 1892.

[57] See Map C.

[58] 97; 101, fo. 483; 102, fo. 479; 113, fo. 41; 115, fo. 281; 125; 126; 148a, fo. 141; *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 10 (15 May 1896), p. 2, and iii, 11 (1 June 1896), p. 2; Money and Smith, 'Explorations', p. 168; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 12.

[59] McClonnie, Smith and Fraser, reported in *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 10 (15 May 1896), p. 1, and iii, 13 (1 July 1896), p. 2.

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the most serious intrusion was from the direction of Tete. After his return to Africa in 1892, Wiese had occupied himself with his newly won estates in the Zambezi Valley, where his activities attracted the unfavourable attention of Johnston. His interests in Mpezeni's country took second place for a while, despite his letter to Johnston about them on 14 May 1893. It appears that when the Mozambique Company's party arrived at Tete in April 1895 they made contact with Wiese. Thereafter he was closely connected with the activities of the Mozambique Company and of its successor, the North Charterland. The exact course of events is not clear. Johnston reported on 24 March 1896 that Wiese had broken with the North Charterland, yet when Warton visited Mpezeni four months later as leader of the North Charterland delegation, Wiese was with him as interpreter.[60]

At the beginning of 1896 representatives of the North Charterland first arrived in Ngoni country. After a short time, one of them was expelled by Mpezeni. On 5 July 1896 Warton with the main party established the North Charterland headquarters at a camp, later known as Fort Young, in the heart of Ngoniland adjacent to Loangeni, headquarters of segment 10.[61]

At first Mpezeni treated the North Charterland party kindly and provided them with carriers to bring up their loads from Tete.[62] According to the Foreign Office, whose sources of information I cannot trace, Mpezeni was friendly because Wiese emphasized that he was a German and offered himself and the expedition as a bulwark against British expansion. Warton, the ex-secretary of a cricket team and sometime lieutenant-colonel, posed, it was said, as Wiese's elder brother.[63] These allegations were denied by Warton and Wiese. They pointed out that the first member of the North Charterland party to enter Ngoniland had been an Englishman and maintained that Mpezeni was too intelligent not to recognize for himself the difference between an Englishman and a German. Warton had been introduced by Wiese merely as *okullo-ango* [*mkulu wangu*, my superior]. They maintained that the British flag had always been flown with the North Charterland's own flag.[64] Warton and Wiese's testimony conflicts with the Ngoni recollection

[60] *Maugham report*, p. 7; 121, fo. 192; 163; 164; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12*f*.

[61] 121, fo. 192; 163; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12, 71. Deare, who never mentions Warton or Wiese by name, claims to have been first to build the fort. Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April.

[62] Forbes in *C.A.P.*, 15 November 1896; Warton in *African Review*, x, 216 (9 January 1897), p. 67; Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April; 148a, fo. 141.

[63] 160, p. 64; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 12; Read, 'Tradition', p. 478.

[64] 163; 164.

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439 of these events, as recorded by Read, and with the contemporary
648 account of Genthe. Genthe was a German traveller who always flew a British flag in central Africa. There was no flag at Warton's camp when he visited it in 1897 and the North Charterland asked him not to display his Union Jack. Whatever may really have happened, an explanation of the North Charterland's success by reference to its anti-British pose conflicts with the evidence of Mpezeni's missions of friendship to the Collector at Kotakota. Deare, one of the North Charterland party, gives the impression that the success of the expedition was due to his ability to speak Zulu, make the right presents, and diagnose the cause of illness in Mpezeni's cattle. This explanation seems just as likely.[65]

It seems probable that Mpezeni was prepared to be friendly with the British at a distance but did not want them on his doorstep. We have noted his deputation to Johnston in January 1890. Early in 1896 Mpezeni sent a mission to the Collector at Kotakota asking for a British flag. Surprisingly this overture seems not to have been followed up. Swann, the Collector, did, however, send twelve beasts as a present to Mpezeni who replied, after prompting from Swann, with a gift of ivory.[66] In September Mpezeni sent word to the Collector that he had punished his warriors who had attacked some B.S.A. Company's carriers. In October his envoys told the Collector that he did not allow raiding and that he was glad to hear of raiders being punished when they were caught, while in February 1897 he appealed through his messengers to the Administration for help in restraining his people from raiding inside Nyasaland.

Wiese accompanied Mpezeni's envoys on this last trip to Kotakota and according to a North Charterland account of their mission, Mpezeni then consented to the introduction of a British garrison in his territory.[67] Even towards Warringham, the B.S.A. Company's representative, he was friendly at first. In about June 1896 he exchanged presents with him and made many expressions of good will, though telling Warringham that he was not afraid to meet him in war if necessary.[68]

[65] Genthe, 'Mpezeni's', p. 1; 165; Deare, 'Slave raiders', 20, 27 April, 4 May.

[66] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 4 (15 February 1896), p. 1, and iii, 8 (15 April 1896), p. 1; *A & P*, 1896, lviii, p. 427; Swann, *Slave hunters*, pp. 315-16.

[67] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 12 (15 June 1896), p. 1; iii, 18 (1 October 1896), p. 2; iii, 22 (1 December 1896), p. 3; iv, 4 (1 March 1897), p. 3; and iv, 7 (15 April 1897), p. 1; 165.

[68] *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 15 (1 August 1896), p. 3; Money and Smith, 'Explorations', p. 168.

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5. *Friction*

On 14 May 1897 Mpezeni wrote to the Collector at Kotakota that he wished to move across the border into the Protectorate. He said, 'If you agree to my removing . . . I shall not raid anywhere.' He was prepared to pay tax if called upon to do so.[69] He may have been led to take this drastic step by his growing annoyance at the activities of Warton and the North Charterland party. In 1896 Warton had apparently enjoyed Mpezeni's approval but he soon began to displease him. Johnston, who had no high opinion of his fellow-men, described Warton as 'that not very capable or prudent man', and as 'not a bad man but not very trustworthy'. The North Charterland was a purely commercial company and Warton had no administrative powers. These were reserved under the charter to the B.S.A. Company and were exercised on its behalf by Johnston until 1 July 1895, when Forbes was appointed Administrator for the B.S.A. Company's sphere. As yet, however, in Johnston's view, the B.S.A. Company had no governing rights in Mpezeni's country, as neither Mpezeni, nor the chiefs he was held to have displaced, had ceded them.[70] Forbes's nearest representatives were Warringham and Middleton, who in March 1896 made a camp sixty miles to the north of Mpezeni in the country of Cinunda, a Cewa chief. Forbes visited Mpezeni in September 1896, but with no success.[71] Warton considered that in the absence of any action by the B.S.A. Company he must set up his own administration. He drew up elaborate plans for developing the country, calling for an armed police force and for a hut tax of 5*s*.[72] He believed, he said, that if Mpezeni were convinced that the North Charterland had sufficient force available, he would not resist them.[73] He may have been influenced in adopting this attitude by the remark he attributed to the chief that if he was seriously threatened by Europeans he would give way. This conflicts with Mpezeni's remark to Warringham that he was quite prepared to fight, which we have noted above. According to Johnston, Warton tried to force a flag on Mpezeni and to stop him raiding for slaves. Johnston seems not to have been impressed with the delegations to Kotakota and maintained that Mpezeni organized raids to spite Warton.[74]

[69] 167.

[70] 169, fo. 63; 171, fo. 161; 158, p. 63; *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), p. 2, cols. 1 and 3; *A & P.*, 1896, lviii, p. 425.

[71] Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12, 71; *B.C.A.G.*, iii, 19 (15 October 1896), p. 2.

[72] Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12-13.

[73] 122.

[74] 132, p. 59; 158, p. 62.

[Text continues on page 85]

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6. *Fighting*

The European travellers who came to Ngoniland did not come alone. They brought with them their own retinues of servants and carriers, usually not Ngoni, who took orders only from their own masters and over whose misdoings there was continual friction with the Ngoni.[75] Wiese had an armed guard of a hundred and twenty Makua, though later this was disbanded.[76] Mpezeni insisted that the so-called Fort Young should not have a stockade but only a low reed fence, presumably to prevent the North Charterland from putting themselves beyond the reach of his warriors.[77] On the other hand Warton and the North Charterland directors were insistent that their employees should be armed, sought permission from the Foreign Office to import arms through Nyasaland, and even threatened to withdraw if the B.S.A. Company did not make adequate arrangements for their protection. Johnston was firmly opposed to private armies and private wars, and the Foreign Office advocated that if the North Charterland was in a precarious position it should withdraw until an administration had been established. Eventually Johnston came round to the view that the B.S.A. Company was so committed in Southern Rhodesia that it could not provide the North Charterland with the protection it was entitled to, and that, therefore, the North Charterland had a reasonable claim to arms of its own. Accordingly in July 1896, he reluctantly approved the import of two Maxim guns 'for eventual use against Mpezeni'. These Maxims seem never to have arrived, but Deare successfully smuggled in thirty rifles.[78] Thus the stage was set for struggle by persuasion to give way to struggle by arms.

At the same time as they were thus altering the distribution of power within Ngoni country, the European intruders were developing external relations with other African groups which were incompatible with the raided-raiding relationship existing between them and the Ngoni. Wiese had trading-stations in other tribal areas,[79] and we have already noted his plans for building up a large trading business based on the labour of his wife's slaves. Genthe was friendly with Cewa and Kunda chiefs and on that account tried to represent their interests to Mpezeni after they had been raided.[80] Deare went to visit Cimwala and Undi, Cewa chiefs, in about January

[75] e.g. the affair of the stolen red blankets, described by Deare, 'Slave raiders', 4 May.
[76] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 14.
[77] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April.
[78] 222, pp. 57-8; 229-33; 239-42; 249; 255; 256.
[79] 49.
[80] *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), pp. 1-2.

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1897 and some time later they came to visit him at Fort Young. Deare gave them presents, presumably to gain their support for his own enterprises, and makes no mention of their seeing Mpezeni.[81] Undi was the chief who claimed part of Mpezeni's country in his treaty with Sharpe and who in 1892, when Foà was living in his village, was raided by Ngoni several times a month.[82] Thus the Europeans in Ngoniland were affiliated not only to European groups in Nyasaland and in England out of direct touch with Mpezeni but also with African groups with whom he was in contact. There was an essential contradiction in the situation in which, for example, Deare was friendly with both Mpezeni and Undi while Mpezeni was at war with Undi. Everywhere, not only in Nyasaland, the traditional Ngoni pattern of external relations was becoming incompatible with their relations with Europeans in their midst.

The leader of the opposition to the North Charterland was Nsingu, Mpezeni's heir.[83] Nsingu was at first friendly towards Warton but later his attitude changed. Deare, before establishing the North Charterland camp in 1896, had passed through Nsingu's village, by Ngoni standards an insulting thing to do, and later quarrelled with him, finally flogging him.[84] Genthe, the German traveller, met Nsingu on a path and only grudgingly gave way to let him pass.[85] While Mpezeni remained comparatively friendly, Nsingu and the warriors whose interests he came to represent became increasingly hostile towards all Europeans. At the same time Mpezeni's control over his lieutenants seems not to have been effective, as evidenced by his apparent inability to prevent unauthorized raiding. Deare, according to his own account, enjoyed Mpezeni's favour and was almost forced to marry one of his daughters, and yet Mashanga, the second lieutenant of segment 10, twice tried to kill him.[86] According to Genthe, Mpezeni sent repeatedly for some army leaders who had been raiding and they failed to appear. This may have been deliberate procrastination arranged by Mpezeni, who treated him coldly, but Genthe thought that Mpezeni was only a dummy whose lieutenants did what they liked.[87] With Deare there seems to have been a genuine difference in attitude between Mashanga on the one side and on the other Mpezeni, supported by Mcekwani, the first lieutenant over

[81] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 4 May.
[82] Foà, *Lac Nyassa*, pp. 280-1.
[83] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 13.
[84] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April.
[85] *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), p. 1.
[86] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May. cf. Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 470.
[87] Genthe, 'Mpezeni's'.

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Mashanga. Swann appears to have believed Mpezeni sincerely wished to stop raiding into the Protectorate although his people continued to do so.[88]

The cleavage within the tribe between Chief and people was attributed by Wiese to the large number of captives who had been incorporated.[89] We may well ask whether there had not always been considerable fluidity in the distribution of power among the different branches of the royal house and their supporters. After the death of Zwangendaba there was factional fighting, and at least once on the march north, about 1840, there was a purge in which the original members of the tribe, presumably Ndandwe by origin, killed off many of the more recently incorporated Tsonga who had been promoted at their expense.[90] These struggles show clearly that the formal arrangement of segments within the residential system did not preclude struggles for power within that system. The decline in power of Mpezeni and the rise of his heir must indeed be seen as part of the normal operation of the system rather than the result of manipulation or of unusual external conditions.

Wiese anticipated that there would be fighting on the death of Mpezeni.[91] Some idea of the way in which the fight would have gone in the new circumstances of European contact is given by Wiese's statement, in 1891, that Nzermane would not submit to Nsingu on Mpezeni's death and that he would be the best successor as far as the interests of Portugal were concerned.[92] Later, Deare remarked that the 'king had two other sons, younger than Tsinko, named Zamane and Madzimai, whom I never saw, but I learnt much about them and had fixed my eye on the former for the succession if anything happened'.[93] When British troops had already begun their advance on Ngoni, Manning, their commander, hoped that the tribe would split into factions, some of which would side with him.[94]

Fighting between rival claimants for the throne was likely even without external backing for one candidate. We have only to turn to Zululand for an analogous situation in which there was fighting

[88] Swann's report for 1896, *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 7 (15 April 1897), p. 1.
[89] Wiese, 'Geschichte', p. 187.
[90] See p. 19. Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, p. 24; Chibambo, *My Ngoni*, p. 23; cf. Young, *History*, p. 112, who reverses the role played by witch-finders in this incident.
[91] As reported by Warton in June 1896, cited by Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 13.
[92] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 493.
[93] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May. In modern spelling, Nsingu, Nzermane, and Madzimawi.
[94] 181, fo. 39.

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between rival heirs even while the occupant of the throne was still alive. The brothers Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi fought for the heirship while their father Mpande was still chief.[95]

The apparent ineffectiveness of Mpezeni's rule may well have been due to the increasing segmentation of the State as it expanded and to the growing differentiation of interest between one major segment and another. As it happened, there was no civil war and the tribe did not split, at least not in these terms. A cleavage in the royal house did reveal itself later, in 1903, after British rule had begun, when Madzimawi tried to take the name of Zwangendaba and was opposed by the supporters of Mpezeni II, son of Nsingu. But by then the form of the State was already determined by political forces other than the balanced opposition of segments. It is significant of the changed situation that Madzimawi did not send his armed followers against the new Mpezeni to challenge his succession. Instead he applied to the Native Commissioner for permission to take the name of his grandfather.[96]

Instead of dividing in civil war the whole country united against the European interlopers. Mpezeni alone tried to protect his friend Wiese. The effective cleavage was not between rival heirs but between the Paramount Chief and his people. He was now a man in his sixties who seemed not to want war and who perhaps benefited more than his people from the presents made by Europeans. The Ngoni people continued to believe and teach that fighting was the proper occupation for men. An attempt to exploit this cleavage was made in 1897 when Wiese, perhaps remembering his earlier attempt to serve Portugal and Britain simultaneously, offered his services to the B.S.A. Company. Forbes thought that if Wiese was given troops, he would be supported by Mpezeni, who would then be in a position to hold Nsingu and the Ngoni warriors in check.[97] But this plan was overtaken by events.

We saw in the previous chapter that the organization of the State was based on warfare, not only on war as an activity bringing prestige to successful warriors but also on war as a method of recruitment to the ever-widening segments of the residential system. Without warfare to eliminate the unsuccessful and to bring promotion and dependants to those who survived, the system could not keep going. It was in no sense inevitable that the Fort Jameson Ngoni and the British should fight; we have only to turn to the

[95] Gluckman, 'Kingdom of the Zulu', pp. 35-6, and *Malinowski's Sociological Theories*, pp. 19-20; Krige, *Social system of the Zulu*, p. 19.
[96] See pp. 139*f*.
[97] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 14.

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Ngoni of northern Nyasaland for a similar situation which ended in the relatively peaceful incorporation of the tribe into the framework of colonial administration. But in northern Nyasaland there were no gold-mines, there were only missionaries. Johnston admits that the presence of mission stations among the northern Nyasaland Ngoni embarrassed him, and he refrained from using force against them in 1895 because this might have interfered with missionary activity.[99] In Mpezeni's country there were no mission stations and, as it happened, no gold-mines worth worrying about either; but by the time this fact had been realized it had ceased to be significant for the Ngoni. The North Charterland was formed in the belief that Mpezeni's country was rich. The capital of the company, not all paid up, was £1,000,000 and in 1897 it offered a reward of £10,000 to the discoverer of the first payable gold-field in its concession.[100] Given the fact that wealth of this magnitude was at stake, that there was gold to be found, and given the tactlessness of Warton and the intransigence of Nsingu, it was likely that war would come sooner or later.

As it was, the end of the Ngoni State as a sovereign political unit and its incorporation within a colonial empire came suddenly. Instead of the gradual formation of new groupings and alignments, the new system began as suddenly as the old system ended. We tend to think of the arrival of Europeans in the backwoods of Africa as a gradual process extending through many decades, and indeed even in Ngoniland there were Europeans for at least thirteen years prior to the war. Yet to old Ngoni of to-day the coming of the Europeans is a precisely defined event which took place on 19 January 1898.

The sequence of events which culminated in the fighting was as follows. In May 1897 some of Mpezeni's people began to build shelters and clear gardens at the headwaters of the River Bua, just inside the Nyasaland Protectorate. Sharpe, who had succeeded Johnston as Commissioner, was at first not greatly pleased, but instructed the Collector at Kotakota to make clear to Mpezeni that he would have to conform to the wishes of the Administration. A peaceful settlement between Mpezeni and the British seemed possible, and on second thoughts Sharpe was pleased to see, as he thought, Mpezeni removed from the sphere of influence of the North Charterland and the B.S.A. Company, who might have taken action against him and precipitated a crisis. However, the Collector was single-handed and it seems that he was unable to

[99] *A & P*, 1896, lviii, p. 437.
[100] *African Review*, xiii, 254 (2 October 1897), p. 24.

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visit Mpezeni to arrange a peaceful settlement with him.[101] In any case, although some movement of population may well have taken place, Mpezeni and the greater part of his people remained outside the Protectorate and in the Concession. In October 1897 Warringham, the B.S.A. Company's Collector at Cinunda's, moved in closer to Ngoniland and occupied the abandoned Fort Partridge, twenty miles north of Mpezeni. A month or so later, he appears to have found it prudent to move back again to Cinunda's.[102]

In December Manning, acting as Commissioner while Sharpe was on leave, was told by a North Charterland official at Chikwakwa, on the Shire, that Mpezeni's warriors were said to have murdered two Europeans on their way from Tete. This report was not confirmed. On 28 December[103] news arrived from Warringham that he at Cinunda's and Wiese at Fort Young were in danger of attack and could not communicate with each other. On 4 January there was news that Wiese was safe. According to his own account, Wiese was secretly warned by Mpezeni of the planned attack on him and had time 'on the next dark night' to build a small fortification into which he retired.[104] However, Wiese and his two European companions thought themselves still in danger and on 9 January wrote to the North Charterland general manager and to Warringham at Cinunda's asking for help and arms.[105]

Meanwhile a force of about seven hundred troops was organized by Manning in Nyasaland. Warringham at Cinunda's was reinforced but on 9 January he reported that Ngoni raids were preventing him from collecting provisions. The next day there was news that Wiese, now with three other Europeans, was still surrounded at Fort Young and that the Ngoni had mustered fully forty thousand fighting men. The rear troops, whose progress

[101] 172, fo. 61; 172, fo. 172; 173.

[102] Poole implies, but does not specifically mention, the move back to Cinunda's. In 1897 Genthe referred to the Cinunda camp as Fort Jameson and according to Poole this name was transferred to Fort Partridge when Warringham moved there. If so, the name must have been transferred back again with Warringham, for the Fort Jameson mentioned in reports of the fighting, both by Poole and in *B.C.A.G.* and dispatches, is the Cinunda camp. On the other hand, the new Fort Jameson established at Kapatamoyo's after the war is said to have been some twenty miles south of the earlier station of the same name. cf. *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 13 (1 August 1897), p. 1; *Reports on the Administration*, 1898-1900, p. 71; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 12, 14-15, 19. The name Fort Young was also moved about, being at first applied to a camp near Missale. cf. *C.A.P.*, 15 November 1896, p. 5, and 1 December 1896, p. 3.

[103] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 15, says this message reached Kotakota on 21 December. This seems unlikely, for Manning states that he received the news at Zomba by wire from Kotakota on the morning of 28 December. cf. 174; 175, fo. 376; *B.C.A.G.*, v, 1 (15 January 1898), p. 1.

[104] Wiese, 'Geschichte', pp. 156*ff*.

[105] 177-80.

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towards Ngoniland had been halted after the report of 4 January, resumed their march.

Four companies under Captain Brake reached Cinunda's on 17 January and left the next day for Fort Partridge, which was burnt by Ngoni as they arrived. On 19 January they moved on towards Fort Young. After some skirmishing they arrived there at 5.20 p.m. and relieved Wiese and his companions. Fort Young was only a few hundred yards outside Loangeni, headquarters of segment 10, and in the morning Brake found that this village and others near by, including Nsingu's, were full of warriors. Accordingly he decided not to withdraw to Fort Partridge as he had intended and sent his troops to clear the villages and burn them down. Later in the day there was organized fighting but in the face of fire from seven-pounders and Maxims the Ngoni lost heavily. The number of Ngoni warriors involved was estimated at from 4,000 to 5,000.[108]

On the next day, 21 January, Mpezeni sent messengers to Captain Brake with a present of a sheep. Brake regarded this poor present as an insult and insisted that he would negotiate only with important lieutenants. The next day, five messengers arrived with twelve head of cattle, but Brake regarded the messengers as slaves and said that if a lieutenant did not come the next day, he would deal with Cimpinga, headquarters of segment 15 where Mpezeni was living, as he had dealt with Nsingu's village. On 23 January a lieutenant and an important man arrived to see Brake and were interviewed by him the next day. They stated that Mpezeni was weary of the war brought on by the misconduct of his sons, and that he placed himself in Brake's hands to impose what conditions of peace he might choose. When Brake arrived at Cimpinga on 25 January he was met by two men who said that Mpezeni had gone into hiding outside the village. Brake told them to tell Mpezeni to come, otherwise the village would be destroyed. Brake waited until 5 p.m. and then burnt the village except for Mpezeni's own hut and those of his wives. The next day Lt. Sharp, with five men, succeeded in encountering Mpezeni, who had fifty men with him. Mpezeni asked for twenty minutes' grace while his wives got away and managed to slip away himself.

The main body of troops under Manning arrived at Cimpinga on 28 January. Manning sent out messengers to inform the Ngoni that unless Nsingu was handed over by the night of 30 January, troops would 'penetrate to every valley in Mpezeni's country and punish every village where opposition was encountered'. Manning

[108] cf. Read, 'Tradition', p. 475; Bradley, *Northern Rhodesia*, pp. 44-5.

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received defiant answers to his messages and on 31 January dispatched four columns each of about two hundred men to sweep the eastern portion of the country. On 3 February Nsingu was surrounded by troops and surrendered to them. Manning tried Nsingu by court martial for murder, instigating to murder and raiding in British territory. He was found guilty and shot on 4 February in the presence of all captured lieutenants. On 5 February another column visited the southern portion of the country. Manning left the country the next day. He recommended, possibly on Deare's advice, that Mpezeni should be allowed to return as chief.

Mpezeni voluntarily surrendered to Brake on 9 February and was told he would be allowed to resettle and that his people could reoccupy their villages. A great number of these must, however, have been burnt by the troops, for even on 23 January Brake had reported that in one district there was hardly a village or hut left standing. More villages had been destroyed by the columns sent out by Manning.[107]

After Mpezeni's surrender, Brake continued trying to capture other important people thought to have been supporters of Nsingu, but it seems no more villages were burnt. Some leaders went into hiding, other like Madzimawi fled west to Nsenga country, while Mlonyeni, head of segment 6, went to Mwambera's country in northern Nyasaland. Mpezeni had at first been instructed to live in a village near his former home at Cimpinga, but was later moved to an Ngoni village near Fort Manning, which Brake was then building just inside the Nyasaland border. After a year he was allowed to return to the centre of his country and was reinstated as chief. He died from natural causes soon afterwards on 21 September 1900.[108] The leaders who had fled drifted back and no further action was taken against them. Some people began to cultivate their gardens again and to make shelters.[109] Others, particularly Cewa who had been captured only a short while before 1898, left Ngoniland and either returned to their former tribal areas or moved on elsewhere.

Although fighting between Ngoni and British ceased, there was still some scrapping between the North Charterland and the

[107] For the preceding paragraphs. see 176, fo. 372-4; 181; 184-90; 193-5; 198; *B.C.A.G.*, v, 1-3 (15 January, 5 and 26 February 1898), p. 1 of each issue; Poole, *Native tribes*, pp. 14-16, 71; Baxter, 'Angoni rebellion', p. 17 (map); Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May.

[108] *B.C.A.G.*, 118, vii, 9 (30 September 1900), p. 3. In view of this newspaper report the statement that Mpezeni died in October, made in *Reports on the Administration* 31 *March* 1902 and followed by Poole and others, must be wrong.

[109] 201; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 16; Duff, *Nyasaland*, p. 42; Stigand, 'Natives of Nyasaland', p. 126.

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B.S.A. Company's administration which now began to operate in Mpezeni's country itself. Each had its own African police force and on one occasion two people who had been taken prisoner by the Administration's police were released by a party of North Charterland police. The North Charterland police then arrested the Administration's police, and it was necessary for troops to come from Nyasaland to release them and arrest the North Charterland men.[110] By the end of 1899, however, conditions had become more settled. The B.S.A. Administration had acquired effective control over the whole of Mpezeni's country outside Nyasaland.

The military operations in December 1897 and in 1898 were carried out during the wet season and in consequence there was much sickness among the troops. Although it was not the time of year which the Europeans would have chosen for a campaign, according to one of my informants Warringham had been advised by an Ngoni man whose support he had gained that he should arrange for the war to take place while all the warriors were away from the immediate vicinity of Fort Young attending the national first fruits ceremony at the headquarters of segment 4, the village of Zwangendaba's great wife. The descendants of this man are still regarded as traitors by other Ngoni. The first fruits ceremony was usually held about the new year, so that the war may in fact have followed immediately after the ceremony. This view is supported by the remark made by Harding, who arrived in Ngoniland a few months after the war was over. He said that the war 'arose over a highly strung official [presumably Warringham] mistaking an ordinary Native dance for an act of hostility towards the Administration'.[111] Whatever the truth in the matter, the first fruits ceremony would have been an appropriate time for Nsingu to call for an attack on the Whites.

7. *Cattle*

It has been estimated that before the war there were about 20,000 head of cattle in Mpezeni's country.[112] During the fighting many were taken from Ngoni by Protectorate troops. These animals became the subject of much recrimination. Read states that half the cattle of the Ngoni were taken as 'rightful loot', while Poole states that a large portion of the 14,000 head captured were ultimately restored to their Ngoni owners.[113]

[110] **s23**, fo. 368.
[111] Harding, *Far Bugles*, p. 82.
[112] **s32**, p. 69 has 24,000, while *Report on the Administration*, 1903, p. 19, has 15,000-20,000.
[113] Read, 'Tradition', p. 478; Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 16.

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According to Manning, in his first report on the matter dated 17 February 1898, nearly 12,000 head were captured. It seems clear that at the time Manning thought that the whole of this herd would be used for the benefit of the B.S.A. Company, for he wrote:

> 'I have informed the British South Africa Company that we shall require them to pay the actual expenses incurred by us on account of the campaign. I do not imagine the total cost to the British South Africa Company will be more than 2,000*l*. This will be covered ten times over by the value of the cattle captured by the expedition, so that the British South Africa Company will reap a handsome profit on the campaign.'[114]

There seems, however, to have been considerable discussion among Europeans in the region about the disposal of the cattle. Roberts, a surgeon who had been one of Wiese's companions at Fort Young, was dismissed from the North Charterland shortly after the war ended. Wiese also left the country after the war and lost his North Charterland post worth £900 a year. Manning suggests that these two were anxious to make trouble by attacking the conduct of the war. St. Hill, the North Charterland manager, may have been anxious to forestall any accusations for on 23 April he published in a newspaper a statement admitting that there had been criticism on the capture of the cattle, but pointing out that 'Army regulations provide for a certain amount of loot'. He said that it had been a wonderfully cheap expedition, that the Protectorate men who went in certainly deserved something, and that he expected that the B.S.A. Company would return a very large number of cattle to the Natives.[115] Editorial comment on his article was nevertheless critical. Criticism began to be heard in Britain. A letter was written to the Parliamentary Secretary responsible, a question was asked in the Commons, and an article appeared in *Truth*. According to one account, the military officers said they expected £400 or £500 each from their share of the loot.[116] Whether or not he was influenced by this criticism, Sharpe on leave in England proposed on 12 May that half the captured herds be returned to the Ngoni, the other half to be retained by the B.S.A. Company.[117] On the same day the Foreign Office replied to Manning's dispatch of 17 February, quoted above, with the statement that the B.S.A. Company wanted only three hundred beasts. Manning was asked to

[114] 193.
[115] *Central African Times*, i, 30 (23 April 1898), p. 3.
[116] 216, fo. 8; 217; *Parliamentary Debates, 4th series*, lv (1898), cols. 1240, 1654-5; *Truth*, xliii, 1122 (30 June 1898), pp. 1639-40.
[117] 202.

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consider returning some of the remainder to the Ngoni.[118] Manning replied that representatives of the B.S.A. Company had already made arrangements for driving away five thousand cattle. He proposed to return three thousand to Mpezeni.[119]

The subsequent course of events is not clear. Poole states that due to the opportune arrival and intervention of Selby, a member of the B.S.A. Company's Administration, a large proportion of the cattle were ultimately restored to their Ngoni owners. This is in accord with Sharpe's statement on 6 July that 'Mpezeni . . . has had all his cattle returned to him [his underlining]'. A missionary journal published in Blantyre on 15 July stated that probably a considerable part of the cattle had been returned.[120] Manning, who was in a better position to know than Sharpe, who was still on leave, wrote on 31 August that all the cattle had been returned to the Natives with the exception of about a thousand head handed over to the B.S.A. Company as a fine and about two hundred kept for the use of the troops.[121] The matter then seemed to have been settled.

In the next year the North Charterland continued its quarrel with the B.S.A. Company, and the disposal of the captured cattle was discussed again. The North Charterland complained that the whole Ngoni war had been unnecessary and had been provoked by the B.S.A. Company. There had been wholesale looting of cattle which had been disposed of in the interests of the officers concerned, Natives had been expelled from their lands, and in consequence the commercial prospects of the North Charterland had been ruined. The Foreign Office replied to these allegations on 23 August 1899, stating that so far as the cattle were concerned, five thousand head were to be driven out, three thousand returned to Mpezeni, and the balance held at the disposal of the B.S.A. Company, apart from two hundred and fifty head captured inside the Protectorate and driven off for use by the troops. This reply, referring to what would be done rather than what by then presumably had been done, appears to have been based on the arrangements proposed by Manning on 20 May 1898. Either the arrangements he reported on 31 August 1898 were never put into operation or else they were overlooked by mistake when the Foreign Office reply to the North Charterland was drafted a year later. The latter explanation seems more probable.[122]

[118] 203.
[119] 207.
[120] Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 16; 211, fo. 228; *Life and Work in British Central Africa*, 125 (15 July 1898), p. 3.
[121] 213, fo. 456.
[122] 230; 233.

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Manning stipulated that cattle handed back to the Ngoni should not be sold, to prevent traders bartering cattle for gunpowder.[125] Nevertheless the majority of the cattle remaining in or returned to Ngoni hands were sold within two years. In April 1898 over 14,000 head of cattle were counted.[126] Whether or not all these were in Ngoni ownership at the time is not clear, although the North Charterland implied in a letter written in 1899 that at least 12,000 belonged to Ngoni.[128] During the next year or so, in spite of Administrative opposition, many thousands of cattle were sold to traders or killed. By 31 March 1900 only 1,224 remained.[126] Thus another of the systems of social relationships, those mediated through cattle, which had sustained the old social order, was undermined.

8. *The end of a system*

Thus ended the Ngoni war and with it the Ngoni State. In the last twelve years of its existence, from 1886 to 1898, three struggles were proceeding simultaneously in linked regions of social space. First there were the traditional processes already described by which Ngoni killed and recruited their neighbours and by which cleavages between segments of their residential system widened and altered with time. Second there was the struggle between Portugal, Great Britain and, peripherally, Germany for the political control of south-central Africa. Third there was a struggle between different groups of financiers in London for the control of the rich economic resources which they believed, quite mistakenly as far as we can now tell, lay waiting to be discovered in Mpezeni's country and round about. Apart from these three major fields of activity, there were two others which affected this particular area to a lesser degree. There were the traders and adventurers like Wiese (until 1896), Matakenya and the Arabs who competed with one another and endeavoured to exploit the region in terms of ivory, gunpowder and slaves. There were also the various missions, representing the interests of their co-religionists and anti-slavery enthusiasts in Europe, competing with each other and with the slave traders for local control. There was even a scheme for colonizing Mpezeni's country with Christian laymen from Britain.[127] All these social fields were interwoven in reality, but in analysis

[125] 207; 208, fo. 15; 233.
[126] *Reports on the Administration*, 1898-1900, p. 65.
[128] 230, p. 69. Duff, *Nyasaland*, p. 393, implies that all the 14,000 belonged to Ngoni.
[126] *Reports on the Administration*, 1898-1900, p. 65.
[127] 87.

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our task is to separate them out. Yet even in analysis we have to show how each field interlocks with the other two, how events in one field set up movements in others.

The material apparatus used in the various fields was distinct. The traditional processes were decided ultimately by resort to spears and shields. Portugal and Britain fought with artillery, embargoes, customs dues and treaties. The North Charterland fought its rivals with concessions, certificates of claim and share capital.[128] Mpezeni, who knew how to fight with spears, was asked to sign pieces of paper which would then be negotiable in a property system of which he knew nothing, and the manipulators of which knew little of him. The treaty-collectors imagined a patchwork of stationary chiefdoms spread over the region, each with a chief powerful enough to sell his country, whereas in fact there was only an unstable series of groups of shifting cultivators, each liable to attack from the migrating Ngoni.

Yet despite the differences in technique and despite the lack of knowledge of each other's systems of government, the various groups involved continued to pursue their own ends as best they could. Mpezeni may not have known what a flag was, yet the issue between Portugal and Britain was decided, and decided in Lisbon rather than in Ngoniland. The treaties may have been made beyond the competence, and the understanding, of the chiefs who signed them, and yet the B.S.A. Company did gain control of the country. Mpezeni never made his mark on a document, yet the North Charterland acquired its ten thousand square miles of land. On the other hand, the Ngoni regiments tried to win another battle like the others they had won before, and this time they failed. In consequence of the war of 1898 there was a revolution, a change of structural form, in Ngoni society, whereas in the histories of Portugal and Britain, and even of the B.S.A. Company, the event passed almost unnoticed.

In northern Nyasaland an analogous process of incorporation within a wider system was taking place. Here also there was an intruding European group and the same distant interest of the Nyasaland Administration. Yet in many ways the chain of events in northern Nyasaland was simpler than at Fort Jameson. In the north, there was only one set of resident Whites, the Livingstonia missionaries, there was no Wiese willing to play for both sides at once, and there was no North Charterland. In consequence the

[128] cf. Kuper, *African Aristocracy*, p. 24: 'Swazi were subjugated through concessions, a type of economic warfare eventually sanctioned by powerful European governments.'

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relationship between Ngoni and Europeans was of a somewhat different kind, and one of its most interesting features was an attempt by the Ngoni, persisted in for many years, to establish a monopoly over the missionaries, at the expense of another tribe with whom they were at war.[129] In Fort Jameson the social field was more complex. One of Mpezeni's sons tried to sell ivory to Wiese illegally without his father's knowledge,[130] and we may look on this as an attempt to establish a relationship with him differentiated from the wider relationship between Wiese and the Ngoni as a whole, or perhaps as an attempt on Wiese's part to penetrate Ngoni society along its lines of structural cleavage. His and Deare's support for a candidate for the heirship was similar in intention. Mpezeni's efforts to gain support from Kotakota against his people was a more noticeable attempt to utilize the power of the Whites in his own sectional interest. Similarly the readiness with which raided chiefs made treaties was certainly related to their weak position in relation to the Ngoni and their hope of support against them. Even with the traders, as distinct from the treaty-collectors, this consideration was relevant. Deare relates how he asked Mpezeni to prevent raiding near the North Charterland supply route which passed through Undi's country. When later he visited Undi, he was welcomed for stopping the raids and was given ivory. Thus although at Fort Jameson no one group had a monopoly of access to the Europeans, there were these attempts to establish specific relations with them to the advantage of the different groups concerned.

For as soon as two groups are brought into contact, and for some reason neither group annihilates the other, there is a change in the structure of the social field in which they act. Life can no longer go on as before, for every man has new potential allies and new potential enemies. There is no established order to which appeal can be made, for a new order has to be created. A new set of alignments, a new social structure, emerges from the manoeuvring and intriguing of the transition period which must differ from the old because of the new interests and new relationships which it contains.

Thus Europeans discriminated between one African group and another. Similarly the Ngoni established different relations with different European groups. From the beginning it was clear that the Portuguese and the British were to be distinguished, and Mpezeni preferred the inaction of the former to the efficiency of

[129] cf. Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, pp. 97, 129, 237 and 245.
[130] Wiese, 'Expedição', x, pp. 491-2.

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the latter. This alignment established, it was natural that Warton, though not himself a party to the Imperial struggle, should utilize it by arriving in the country from Tete, in Portuguese territory, rather than from Nyasaland, that he should pose as Wiese's brother, and, assuming that the Foreign Office was correctly informed, that he should fly a Portuguese flag. Genthe played a similar game with his Union Jack, but in a different area among the raided tribes. Even among the British, Mpezeni had three groups to deal with, North Charterland, B.S.A. Company, and the Nyasaland Administration. He was initially friendly and later hostile towards the first, unyielding to the second, and appealed for help to the third, although, or perhaps because, it was farthest away. 439 648

The effective cleavage within the Ngoni chiefdom was between the chief and his eldest son. We might have expected the major cleavage to have been between one son and another, particularly in view of North Charterland support for one son rather than another. We have some information concerning who Wiese and Deare thought were their friends, but some of these people appear to have taken a prominent part in the fighting. Mpezeni was certainly not entirely deserted by his own people, for he was able to send emissaries to Kotakota and to warn Wiese and Deare of plots against their lives.[121] The situation in which one section of the population supported the chief and the remainder supported his son may have been facilitated by the existence of what we have called rump segments in the residential system. For in this system the dependants of a segment head were not completely divided up among his heirs; there was a remainder who even after the death of the head constituted a rump segment and represented his interests as against those of his sons. Thus it may be that Mpezeni was supported by those who remained in his great wife's village, or perhaps in his father's great wife's village, as against those who had broken out from it. In the absence of satisfactory evidence, our hypothesis remains unverified. Such evidence as there is, is contradictory. Deare made friends, eventually, with the two senior lieutenants of segment 10, the segment of Mpezeni's great wife; this would support our thesis, as does Wiese's mention of the senior of these as one of his friends. Yet both of them, according to my informants, descendants of these men, were shot in the course of the campaign; this points against our thesis. In the list of friends and enemies which Wiese and his companions gave Brake, segments 4 and 10 each have members in both lists. Among those listed as friends are Ciboma msitini, regional governor in segment 4 and 439 578 648 668

[121] Wiese, 'Geschichte', p. 186; 187, fo. 137; Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May.

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Mcekwani mpanza (Chequani), a lieutenant of segment 10. Among the enemies are Ngoka Lukhezo zulu (Goka), a lieutenant of segment 4, and Kamzembe maiemesa (Camsembe), regional governor in segment 10.[122] The elucidation of this cleavage is further complicated by the fact that from 1889 until 1898 Mpezeni lived at least most of the time not with his great wife but with his favourite, the leader of the subsidiary bevy in segment 15.[123] He may have done this to place himself at a distance from Wiese, who had a store at the headquarters of segment 4, Mpezeni's father's great wife's village, and from the North Charterland, whose Fort Young was just outside the headquarters of segment 10, his own great wife's village. There is, however, no definite evidence for this.

Regarding the Europeans for the moment as external agents, we can see how inter-African relations were affected by them. Within the chiefdom the most striking phenomenon was the prohibition on raiding imposed by the Whites. It was this which appears to have accentuated the cleavage between Mpezeni and his sons and which may have given Nsingu an external object of attack formidable enough to unite him with his brothers. The Ngoni State was essentially a military one and each successive generation of leaders needed to glorify themselves in battle. Mpezeni at the end of his life, his battles over, could well favour peace but his sons had still to demonstrate their valour and swell their segments with captives. The prohibition on raiding struck at at the root of the State, socially as well as economically. External relations changed their content, and neighbouring chiefs were able to visit Ngoniland unmolested. A more significant change of relation was attempted when Chabisa tried to unite the Fort Jameson and northern Nyasaland groups of Ngoni against the Europeans. Chabisa failed, but even so Ngoni re-established contact with the Ndebele after a lapse of some sixty-five years as the direct result of European action.

In all this the Arabs played only a minor part. Some Arabs traded with Mpezeni for slaves, and Ngoni used sometimes to raid Arab caravans. This we know from Deare, who saw an Arab with Mpezeni and to whom Nsingu related the story of a successful attack on a caravan. Deare mentions that this Arab tried to influence Mpezeni against him.[124] Apart from this, there is little information on their dealings with this group of Ngoni. The main struggle between Administration and Arabs was fought out at

[122] 187, fo. 137. cf. Winterbottom, 'Histories', p. 20.
[123] Angus, 'Northern Angoniland', p. 79.
[124] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 27 April and 4 May.

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Karonga in 1895 and although slave trading went on through Portuguese territory even after 1900, Arabs never made any effort to maintain this trade in the Fort Jameson area. 439 648 [567]

When Wiese left the country in 1898 his work was done. His departure symbolized the end of the pioneering stage of colonialism and the beginning of the stage of settled paternal administration. Mpezeni was reinstated after the war, but there was no position into which Wiese could have been reinstated, nor anyone who wanted to reinstate him. Unlike Mpezeni, Wiese did not represent the long-term interests of any powerful group. In the history of empires there are many examples of men like Wiese who succeeded in weathering the transition from one phase to another and ended their lives in honour and glory. But Wiese had sold his assets before the war began. When it was over, his one saleable attribute, his friendship with Mpezeni, had been compromised and was no longer of value. He departed from a scene which had no place for him.

An examination of how the Imperial and the financial struggles were inter-connected would take us beyond the bounds of Ngoniland and of our subject. We have, however, shown that the three social fields were inter-connected, and that moves in one field were affected by and in turn inspired moves in another. It is important to realize that this inter-connection was not due merely to geographical accident. From one point of view it was accidental that Ngoniland should lie near so many frontiers and that there should be an ancient gold-mine in the vicinity. But Britain, the North Charterland, and Nsingu were all struggling partly for the same thing, control of the Ngoni people. Even Warton understood this. At the end of 1896 he was asked: 'The Natives, I understand, are friendly?' He replied: 'I am glad to say that, so far, we have succeeded in establishing most friendly relations with M'Pesene. . . . Fighting would not only be costly, but we should lose our labourers if we engaged in hostilities. So you see on selfish, as well as humanitarian grounds, we have every reason to avoid warfare and bloodshed.'[135] The mineral resources of Mpezeni's country may have been largely illusory but the human resources were real. Ngoni men could fight for slaves, for dependants, for cattle and for glory; they could carry loads from Tete and prepare to work in the North Charterland's mines; or they could migrate to Southern Rhodesia to work there: but they could not do all these things simultaneously. The fight to destroy the Ngoni army was as much one to secure a labour supply for European capital investment as it was to secure 439 464 648

[135] *African Review*, x, 216 (9 January 1897), p. 67.

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439 464 648 law and order. In this, not only the Ngoni were concerned. There was a shortage of labour in Nyasaland and Mpezeni's raids prevented labourers reaching that country from the interior. The campaign against Mwase in 1895 was undertaken partly with the aim of opening up labour routes and Mpezeni's defeat carried this a stage further. The Collector at Kotakota wrote shortly after the war: 'It is quite safe to say that no greater assistance has been given to these districts (and in fact to the Protectorate) than this opening up of the Luapula Valley by the conquest of Mpezeni.'[126] Yet the Luapula is 350 miles from Fort Jameson. Even Ngoni technical skill in fighting was of value to the new conquerors, for within six [167] months of the war Ngoni fighting men were in Southern Rhodesia, not as allies of the Ndebele but as part of the British South Africa Police. Within ten months, the headquarters of segment 13 had been moved to make way for the new Administrative capital. With the defeat of Mpezeni, North-Eastern Rhodesia became a country.

178 361 648 A final point requires explication. Granted that the Ngoni social system had to change in this new complex social environment, and granted also that their activities, in particular raiding, had to be adapted to new demands on their labour, why did not the Ngoni continue to live in large villages as they had done hitherto? There are numerous analogies in Africa where segmentary social systems have been fitted into an Administrative framework, and where raiding has given way to migrant labour, and yet the pattern of settlement has remained the same. Why did the big Ngoni villages disappear after 1898?

Part of the answer to this question can be stated in ecological terms. In pre-conquest times, the dense population, human and bovine, the great stretches of cultivated land, and the manifest prosperity of the people impressed themselves vividly on contemporary observers accustomed to the scattered settlements of the surrounding tribes. Angus writes:

> 'Before us lay an undulating valley some miles in breadth, which, as the heavily timbered hills on either side proclaimed, had once been covered with forest, but was now denuded of every vestige of a tree. Village after village surrounded by waving cornfields, and green plains dotted with herds of cattle, stretched away into the distance. Never before in any of my African wanderings had I seen such an extent of land under cultivation; the cornfields seemed unending, and the size and number of the

[126] *B.C.A.G.*, v, 6 (30 April 1898), p. 4.

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Chapter Four

TRANSITION

1. Administrative policy 2. White control 3. Chiefs 4. County segments
5. Relative status of chiefs 6. Counties as territorial units 7. Villages

1. *Administrative policy*

THE DEFEAT of the Fort Jameson Ngoni in 1898 was followed by the establishment of an Administration under the British South Africa Company. The greater part of the Nyasaland troops who had done the fighting left the area in April 1898[1] but the North Charterland party remained at their old headquarters at Fort Young, the B.S.A. Company made a base at Fort Patrick a few miles away, and in Nyasaland the Protectorate Administration maintained a station at Fort Manning. The new township of Fort Jameson was established in October 1898[2] and the first mission station was opened by the Dutch Reformed Church Mission at Magwero in 1899, in response to a request for a mission made the previous year by Mpezeni.[3] From these bases, White administrators, traders and missionaries, aided by their Black assistants, began to alter the form of Ngoni life. We are here particularly concerned with political organization, and it was the Administration which was particularly influential in determining what form the new Ngoni political organization would take. But political systems do not exist in isolation, and the kinds of political relationship which we find existing to-day have been influenced by the changing economic, commercial and religious relationships which have been determined more specifically by traders, labour recruiters, planters and missionaries as well as by the exertions of administrators.

The Administration of North-Eastern Rhodesia was in the hands of the B.S.A. Company, and the policy adopted was to some extent influenced by developments in other territories administered by the Company. Southern Rhodesia was much more accessible from the sea than North-Eastern Rhodesia, more capital had been invested in it, and its mineral wealth appeared to be considerably greater. North-Eastern Rhodesia was therefore

[1] 220, fo. 67.
[2] *Reports on the Administration*, 1898-1900, p. 71.
[3] Bruwer, *Mbiri*, p. 22.

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regarded as a territory which would supply Native labour and, possibly, cattle to the south. Little attempt was made to develop the resources of the territory itself, and indeed in so far as Mpezeni's country was concerned, the B.S.A. Company had ceded its rights to do so to the North Charterland. The general pattern of White-Black participation in economic activity was taken over from South Africa, whence many of the early settlers came, and there was no attempt to train a Black *élite* to perform skilled tasks. Apart from the Ngoni and the Bemba, the Black population of North-Eastern Rhodesia had been taken under the administration of the B.S.A. Company without serious fighting and their chiefs did not have the opportunity to become leaders of opposition against the Whites. The Administration wished to keep its expenses low and found that the cheapest way of running the country was through the indigenous chiefs and headmen. Hence a system of administration grew up which was in many respects similar to that later known as Indirect Rule.[4] Chiefs and village headmen were placed under a statutory obligation to preserve law and order among their people. Some of them were paid a few shillings a year for their labours and were given ceremonial spears of office. There were no formally constituted Native courts, as there are now, but minor cases of all kinds were heard by indigenous tribunals, and the authority of these tribunals appears to have been upheld by the Administration in so far as their judgments were regarded as maintaining law and order. Indeed on occasion the Administration indicated to chiefs what kinds of cases they should deal with and what should be referred to the Administration. The collection of tax, one of the most important activities of the early administrators, was carried out with the assistance, or the enforced co-operation, of the Black leaders. Labour recruiters appear to have operated in much the same kind of way. Thus the commoner in his village found that to a considerable extent access for him to these new White agencies was along the traditional chain of authority through headman and chief. The missions were to a greater extent concerned with establishing relationships with individuals without reference to their position in indigenous society, but even they tried occasionally to work through chiefs and other notables. Thus despite the changed situation, the indigenous order was utilized by the White invaders and in so far as that order was useful to them they endeavoured to uphold it.

Nevertheless, the encouragement given by the Administration to recruiters of labour from the south, and the economic necessity

[4] cf. Hailey, *African Survey*, pp. 452-3.

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of earning money to pay tax, together with such subsidiary measures as the prohibition of Native smelting, and the pressure on men to clothe themselves in imported clothing, ensured that the old order changed beyond the mere loss of sovereignty. Not only were links established with Southern Rhodesia and later with other parts of Africa, but new patterns of distribution of wealth and power were set up which were incompatible with the old order. The chief who stayed at home ruling his people found himself outclassed by the newly returned labourers from the south, with their display of clothes, money and urban mannerisms. The relationships between one tribe and another which formerly had found expression in fighting had now to find other expressions, and began to be based on different interests.

These general considerations applied throughout North-Eastern Rhodesia. In Ngoniland local variation was supplied more by the presence of the North Charterland than by the fact that the Ngoni had been defeated in war. The North Charterland was interested in the economic development of its concession, whereas the Administration had to consider the needs of other territories governed by the B.S.A. Company, particularly Southern Rhodesia. The same administrative policy was applied to the Ngoni as to neighbouring tribes which had not been conquered by force of arms. Nevertheless in Ngoni eyes the Administration discriminated against Ngoni in favour of Cewa. Many Cewa who had been captured shortly before 1898 moved away from Ngoniland after the war, or at least moved in the direction of their homeland. With the end of Ngoni raiding the no-man's-land round Ngoni country filled up again with Cewa who had been displaced when the Ngoni first arrived in the 1870s. Cewa chiefdoms were re-established and recognized by the Administration, to the chagrin of the Ngoni.

Even the Ngoni themselves were referred to by the Administration as the 'Angoni-Chewa' by way of emphasizing their mixed ethnic composition. When the Native Reserve scheme was put forward in 1913 the Ngoni chiefs objected to the Cewa being allotted land of their own, and suggested that all the tribes of the district should be placed in one reserve under Mpezeni II. The Administration did not agree. When villages were moved into the proposed reserves in the 1920s, a few more villages left Ngoniland for Cewa country. At the same time other villages moved into Ngoniland from other chiefdoms in the face of alienation of land or difficulties with the Portuguese Administration. Thus to-day many villages in Ngoniland are of Cewa origin and many villages in Cewa chiefdoms are of Ngoni origin.

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Mpezeni

Ngoni origin. The sharp cleavage between the Ngoni and their neighbours has gone.

Another relic of the privileged position enjoyed by the Ngoni before the conquest which did not long survive their defeat was the subsidy paid to Mpezeni. Under the terms of Wiese's alleged concession of 14 April 1891, Mpezeni was to be paid £200 a year and one per cent of Wiese's profits. Wiese made presents to Mpezeni, but there is no record of any substantial payment. When the provisional grant of 10,000 square miles of land was made by the B.S.A. Company to the Mozambique Company on 8 May 1895, the latter agreed not to exercise any rights it might have under Wiese's concessions, but there was no mention of the disposal of any possible obligations. Warton continued Wiese's practice of giving presents to Mpezeni, but there was no regular payment. As Wiese's concession had never been recognized it would seem that there was no legal obligation on either the North Charterland or the B.S.A. Company to pay an annual subsidy. Nevertheless after the Ngoni war the two companies must have come to some agreement on the matter. In April 1898, according to the answer to a question in the Commons, the B.S.A. Company were ready to pay Mpezeni £200 a year 'for the present'. In January 1900 the Administrator stated that the Collector at Fort Jameson had spent only £50 during the current financial year on payments to Mpezeni and 'his loyal indunas'. He proposed to spend a further £50 during the year and the remaining £100 of the subsidy was to be distributed among the surrounding tribes in the interests of the North Charterland.[5] These special arrangements were presumably superseded in 1903 when, under the scheme of Native Administration drawn up in that year, provision was made for the payment of all recognized chiefs from the general funds of the Territory.

Similarly, the military organization of the Ngoni broke down after the conquest. One of the first acts of the Administration was to forbid Ngoni to carry weapons of war.[6] Four new age-set regiments were formed between 1898 and 1914 but they were little more than dancing societies, singing the old songs which had excited their seniors in the 'time of peace' before the conquest but unable to emulate their military achievements. During the 1914-18 war the majority of young Ngoni men who might have formed a new age-set were enrolled as carriers and soldiers on the Allied side.

[5] *Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series*, lv (1898), cols. 1654-5; report of a meeting between Administrator and North Charterland manager, 15 January 1900 (Lusaka archives); cf. Poole, MS., 'Tribes of East Luangwa Province'.

[6] Wiese, 'Geschichte', p. 201.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

effort to induce them to co-operate actively with the government, and by 1910 he was looking forward to reducing the number of White officials in the Administration by devolving much of the Native work on to the Natives themselves. Co-operation was encouraged by the payment of small stipends to chiefs and others, varying in the 1920s in annual value from £22 10*s.* 0*d.* for Mpezeni down to 6*s.* for district messengers.

The Ngoni for the most part neither supported nor opposed this scheme of administration; they merely accepted it. For years the Administration bemoaned the indifference of the Ngoni, but apart from an attempt by a mission to set up its teachers as headmen, there was little attempt to obstruct the work of the Administration.

In matters of land, the authority of the Whites was also dominant, but here the paternal amiability which characterized purely political relations between Administration and Ngoni was lacking. The alienation of land was at the instigation of the North Charterland, who considered themselves the owners of Ngoni country. Fort Jameson was built by the Administration in the middle of Ngoni country and the land round the township, few facilities though the town then had, became more valuable to potential settlers than more fertile but inaccessible tracts. The high density of population in Ngoni country also attracted settlers with the prospect of an adequate labour supply. Thus we find that many of the first tracts of land alienated were located in the middle of Ngoni country, in the most densely populated section. As early as 1 January 1904 the first Commission was appointed to inquire into land questions in Ngoni country.[15] Now that Ngoni had to grow their own food on land which had already been heavily exploited the density of population fell; but in relation to the carrying capacity of the land in perpetuity there was still serious overcrowding. During the unsettled period of the war and its aftermath, the population was dispersed, but from 1900 down to about 1930, in consequence of alienation and the formation of reserves, villages were gradually brought closer together. From 1930 onwards, with the recognition of land shortage by the Administration, villages have been allowed to spread out again. The negotiations concerning where the Ngoni should live have been protracted and complicated; I hope to discuss them in a later work in connexion with the economic background of Ngoni social life. What is here significant about them is that to a very large extent these negotiations have been carried on entirely by Whites, with the Administration representing for the greater part Ngoni

[15] *N.E.R.G.G.*, ii, 1 (1 January 1904), pp. 30-1.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

557 This process was facilitated by the actions of some heads of major
648 segments. It had always been correct procedure for one important person to deal with another through intermediaries, at least in the
[624] opening stages of negotiation, so that lieutenants and others were frequently sent as ambassadors for their lords to the headquarters of other major segments. There was particular point in adopting this procedure in dealing with the Administration since its demands on a man sent to it were unpredictable and apt to be onerous. Thus in many instances a lieutenant or other dependant was presented to the Administration as the headman of an area or a group of villages. This nominee was regarded by the Administration as the rightful leader of the area concerned, a belief often fostered by the nominee himself. In this way effective control of an area passed from the head of a segment to one of his dependants.

Unfortunately, few records of the early administrative arrange-
648 ments have survived. From 1883, when a British consul was first
114 appointed to Nyasaland, down to the defeat of the Ngoni in 1898, the doings of the tribe were of political significance to Britain, and were reported on at length in dispatches which are now public records. After 1898, events of similar importance within the tribe to those that had been reported earlier, the death of this lieutenant or the movement of that village from one site to another, were no longer of any interest to Whitehall or even to the Directors of the British South Africa Company. Thus there was a drastic reduction in the scale of reporting. At the same time the loss of sovereignty, of independent action, involved a reduction in the kind of events which were likely to be recorded. The Ngoni no longer made war or sold slaves. They did pay tax and work in the mines, but this they did not as an independent tribe but as part of Fort Jameson District and the Eastern Province, and such records as there are relate to these administrative units rather than to specific tribes. The B.S.A.
[439] Company lacked the long tradition of administration enjoyed by the Foreign Office and Colonial Office, and its reports were scanty by comparison. Thus the only published report of any kind on affairs in North-Eastern Rhodesia for the year 1905-6 is a mere fifteen lines long, and there is only one sentence on African administration: 'The conduct of the Natives has continued to be satisfactory.'[18] It is not until 1928 that annual reports on African affairs began to be published. Our account of Ngoni history from 1898 until recent times therefore cannot be as complete as we would wish.

[18] *Directors' Report and Accounts*, 1906, p. 7.

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

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423
631
439
634
101

Map D. STATUTORY DIVISION OF LAND, FORT JAMIESON 1949



International Boundary.

N. Charterland Concession, Northern Boundary.

Statutory Division Boundary.

County Boundary.

Farmland in non-African ownership.

Native Reserves.

Native Trust land, crown land and disputed land, treated as if it were Native Trust land.

Portuguese East Africa.

County numbers.

[p. 120]

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

for a few heaps of stones hidden among the trees on the tops of hills. People visit back and forth freely, except for the control imposed at the customs barrier on the one lorry road. Many people grow vegetables in Nyasaland, where there is more land, and sell them in Northern Rhodesia, where there is a better market.

While this territorial proximity gives rise to a multitude of ties linking individuals across the border, it does not lead to new political relations between the counties with a common boundary. Such political relations as do persist are survivals from the old order. Although the formal structure of the Native Court system, as determined by the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia Administrations, does not permit it, cases sometimes come on appeal from the Nyasaland counties to Mpezeni. There is official visiting between chiefs across the border, and when the Paramount Chief is short of food he may ask the Nyasaland chiefs to send him a few baskets of maize. But despite the nearness of the Nyasaland chiefs to Mpezeni in spatial terms, their political interests lie mainly in the opposite direction. They are the only two Ngoni chiefs in that district of Nyasaland and most of the chiefs whom they meet are Cewa. Their Administration is separate from that in Northern Rhodesia, their laws are different, and they look towards Zomba rather than Lusaka as the seat of Administrative power. We have noted how Mpezeni I contemplated moving into Nyasaland in 1897. As late as 1922, when the Native Reserve scheme was under discussion, Mpezeni II made some preliminary soundings on moving across the border, but already by 1946 such projects were overshadowed by the prospects of federation for the two countries of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The people of the two Nyasaland counties are subject to the same general influences as are their Northern Rhodesia neighbours in such matters as increasing dependence on an exchange economy and the development of a cognatic or omni-directional kinship system in which links can be traced through spouses as well as through fathers or mothers. Yet even in economic activity there are significant differences. In Nyasaland, Africans grow tobacco for sale, while the Ngoni in Northern Rhodesia are not able to do so; recruiting for the Rand gold-mines is allowed in Nyasaland and prohibited in most of Northern Rhodesia, including the Fort Jameson area.

The annual meetings of the African Provincial Council of the Eastern Province are attended by representatives from each tribe in the province, two people from Fort Jameson township, the Provincial Commissioner and sometimes a representative of the

1:Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1954 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

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

PLATE XII. The customs post at Fort Manning, on the border between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The passengers on a lorry, mainly women, have put their luggage on the ground for inspection by the customs clerk.

[Facing p. 169]

2: Read E-5 (1935-1939) 1956
FR5 Ngoni FR5

clan and for women of leading Swazi and trans-Zambesi clans. Two of the texts emphasized the distinction conferred on the royal women by special clothing. Cibambo described the use of well-dressed soft skins and of beads and wire, the beads brought with them from the south, the brass wire obtained from the Arabs. In NaNdumbu's text she mentioned cloth bought from the stores. After the Ngoni women gave up wearing soft leather for skirts and the long piece of leather draped from the left shoulder, they used strong cotton cloth of dark blue or black, originally brought by the Arabs and later stocked by the stores. They tied the main cloth under their arms in a draped knot over the breast and on ceremonial occasions they added another fastened on the left shoulder like a plaid. A woman who had been a young girl in the village of Paramount Cikusi, but was not of a leading clan, said that in this village there was a great difference between the royal women and the rest: 'Only the daughters of Cikusi and his big wives could wear dark cloth as the Ngoni do. The others would have been killed if they tried to look like the big women'.

The royal women and the big wives and widows of chiefs and *ahumuzana* were treated by all with whom they came in contact with the distinction and respect due to their prestige. They were addressed and thanked by the term *Nkomo*, with the clan name and the honorific prefix added, except where, as in the case of Bambo Manga, a title had been conferred. She was thanked '*Nkomo Bambo*'.[1] *Ukuhlonipa*, and its Nyanja equivalent *kulemekeza*, meaning to honour and to behave in a respectful manner towards senior people and those of superior rank, was an expression constantly used by the Ngoni and by the other peoples in the Ngoni kingdoms. The forms of showing respect were partly verbal; partly in the position adopted, with the eyes cast down and a slight curtsey by the women when facing someone; partly in the tone of voice when speaking; and partly in the deliberate and controlled behaviour noticed by several early travellers in Nyasaland. A particular verbal form of respect practised by the royal women was the use of the *hlonipa* vocabulary. I found this practice surviving only in the Emcisweni area in northern Ngoniland where the Ngoni language was still spoken, but informants said that it had been common to all married women of trans-Zambesi clans in the northern kingdom when they had spoken Ngoni among themselves. The *hlonipa* vocabulary consisted of the substitution of special words, known only to the women, in order to avoid using a word in which the main syllable of a man's name occurred—a man with whom they were connected by marriage or by affinal relationship.[2] Thus Zwangendaba's wives and widows could

[1] *Bambo* (father) was a term of respect used for important senior men.

[2] *Hlonipa* as a form of special vocabulary was widely practised among the Nguni groups in South Africa. Hoernlé, A. W. 'Social Organisation', in *The Bantu-speaking Tribes of South Africa*, pp. 74, 77.

that despite the vicissitudes of history there is some unbroken but continually changing system of social relationships which we may call Ngoni social structure, and that there is therefore some point in comparing Ngoni marriage in the 1890's with Ngoni marriage to-day; and on the other hand may prepare the way for a broader analysis of Ngoni kinship, of which marriage is one part.

The Fort Jameson Ngoni, with whom alone we are concerned in this paper, differ considerably from the other Ngoni groups in Africa and there is evidence that there are differences in marriage arrangements even from the nearby groups in Northern and Southern Nyasaland. The Fort Jameson Ngoni, numbering about 85,000, live in the Fort Jameson District of Northern Rhodesia and in the Fort Manning division of Lilongwe District of Nyasaland. Their country stretches from 13°25'S to 14°S latitude and from 32°10'E to 35°15'E longitude. Like other Ngoni groups they have a history of migration from Natal at the time of the rise of the Zulu under Shaka in the 1820's. They arrived at their present abode in about 1870 and were conquered by British troops in 1898. The leader of the group was Mpezeni I, and the present Paramount Chief, Mpezeni III, is his son's son's son. There are ten county chieftainships in Northern Rhodesia and two in Nyasaland, and each chief has his own court. The people live by subsistence cultivation, with maize as the main crop. A little maize and some cattle are sold to the local European-owned tobacco farms and in the township of Fort Jameson, but the principal source of money income is work on the farms or at the urban centres of Southern Rhodesia and the railway line of Northern Rhodesia. Many women and almost all men have been to Southern Rhodesia at some time or other[3].

[3] For an outline account of the social structure of this group, see Barnes, 'The Fort Jameson Ngoni', pp. 194 - 252 in Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman, eds., *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa*, London, Oxford University Press, 1951.

4: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949)1951 FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

[P.17]

CHAPTER II

PROCESSES OF CHANGE

1. White conquest

THE SOCIAL system which we have so far described flourished in an environment in which the Ngoni people were separated from other tribes by a no-man's-land. Ngoni raiding parties crossed this tract and returned with captives, food and some cattle. The only other contacts with the outside world were with Arab slave-traders and their agents who exchanged slaves and ivory for cloth and guns, and with a few white and half-caste traders and explorers. In 1898 the Ngoni army was defeated by a force under British leadership and many villages were burnt down. Very many of the cattle were looted and the people dispersed. A White township was built in the middle of the Ngoni kingdom, the warriors were disarmed, and an administrative system was established involving both Whites and Ngoni. Missionaries arrived, schools were opened, labour recruiters and later tobacco planters began their activities.

We are not concerned here with the total effect of this sequence of events but only with the results it has had on marriage. We can distinguish a number of fields in which processes initially external to the indigenous society began to impinge on it and to become part of it. The establishment of White control brought to an end the Ngoni wars. The building up of the Cewa chieftainships contiguous to Ngoni country affected the whole scheme of values held by Ngoni people at the same time as those values were being altered by the intrusion of White technology, political offices, legal concepts, and religions. The physical dispersion of the people in the face of the British troops was followed by a greater dispersion of men, and later of women and children as well, over the mining centres of Southern Rhodesia and the Copperbelt.

The large villages which formed the core of the residential system were burnt, and their inhabitants never all came together again. At first people lived in small settlements of three or four grass shacks built in the hills or in the bush. Gradually the people gathered together in distinct villages, but their population was different in structure from that of the former villages. The groupings of people which stayed together after 1898 represented the smallest fragments of the residential system, and these small fragments collected together into larger associations which were related to, but by no means coincident with, the larger segments of the old system. Some segments left the area and rejoined the tribes from whence they

low productivity and little power of recovery. Next, the weaker soils will be abandoned: such data as we have suggests that this stage is reached when grain yields fall below 200 lb. per acre in the normal season. The former cultivators of the abandoned land may then offer work in exchange for the food surplus still enjoyed by the holders of the stronger soils, or they may be entitled to a share of the surplus by virtue of kinship obligations. In this way a period of increasing pressure and accelerated erosion on the stronger and more fertile soils is brought about. These stages will commonly be accompanied by migration of able-bodied men to the centres of employment and the stage finally be reached when the area is dependent to a large extent on food purchased from outside sources.

In 1941 a study was made of a highly congested area in Fort Jameson District; the area of Mpezeni, Paramount Chief of the Ngoni. The chieftaincy was found to be 54,000 acres in extent and, after detailed survey, the carrying capacity for traditional Ngoni agriculture was estimated to be about 1,300 to 1,400 persons. A total of 7,700 people, between five and six times the carrying capacity, were supposedly living within the chieftaincy. In short, an area which, because of the high proportion of mountain country, had a critical density of only about 16 persons per square mile did in fact appear to be carrying over 90 to the square mile.

The main reasons for the continued survival of this population were found to be as follows:

(a) The time during which these conditions had existed (about 15 years) was not sufficient to show the full effects of this degree of land pressure.

(b) Great areas of hill country and dambos, which would not normally be cultivated, had been taken into cultivation. The almost incredible mountain cultivation on the Nyamfinzi range was, until recently, a startling spectacle. Use of dambo grassland for *fipoka* gardens had seriously reduced grazing and was a sore point with the cattle-loving Ngoni.

(c) Under extreme pressure the population had burst its bounds and an irresistible tide had inundated adjoining private land and unoccupied European farms. In addition, a missionary organization had permitted cultivation, on payment, on land owned by the mission. By these means the effective acreage had, in fact, been increased by almost 50 per cent.

(d) A very heavy burden had been thrown on the limited soils of high fertility and resistance to erosion, the only soils left in the original area still carrying moderately good crops. These soils, then in continuous cultivation, were feeding more than twice as many people as they would normally do.

(e) The Paramount Chief was importing from Nyasaland each year a considerable quantity of food for the use of his people.

10: Barnes E-5 (1946-1949) 1959
FR5 Ngoni FR5
Mpezeni

V. EARNING A LIVING

Intertribal Trade

●439 There is little trade between the Ngoni and the neighbouring tribes, whose products are largely the same as their own. Fish is brought up from the Luangwa valley by Kunda and some of it is sold to the Ngoni of the Cipalamba, through whose villages the hawkers pass on their way to Fort Jameson. Bracelets are sometimes brought from Portuguese East Africa by Chikunda. The main attraction for these hawkers is Fort Jameson itself, and it is the fact that the town is encircled by the Ngoni that gives rise to trading with them. The geographical location of the town has also led to the growth in Ngoni [366] country of many stores and what are known in the vernacular as hotels, where tea and buns can be bought and where sometimes there is shelter for the night.

Of greater importance in the life of the tribe than these intertribal links are those arising from White and Indian economic activities. We may distinguish three zones of interaction, the shops both in Fort Jameson township and scattered throughout the district owned by Whites and Indians, the local tobacco farms, and the mines of Southern Rhodesia. The Ngoni have come to need cloth for clothes which they cannot produce themselves, and it is doubtful if there would be enough animals to provide skins for the tribe even if they did not insist on cloth. The need to earn money with which to buy clothes, soap, and other necessities can be met only by seeking employment on a farm, in Fort Jameson township, or farther off. A few people earn enough by selling vegetables in Fort Jameson, and there is a certain amount of maize and other cereals sold. These sales, however, do not provide sufficient income to reduce materially the extent to which people go out to work.

Control of Movement

101 To the White traveller, Fort Jameson District is an island of tobacco in a sea of bush. To the Ngoni, the island is not so sharply demarcated, and its characteristic property is cattle, not tobacco, yet it still remains an island, surrounded by a sea of other tribes whose 101 traditions are different from their own. The ships that cross this sea 489 are the lorries. In time past, men used to walk to their destinations, [493] going by Feira to Southern Rhodesia, or across the Luangwa to Broken Hill. A few used to go down to Lake Nyasa, and thence to the